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We present an extension to the model of non-atomic congestion games (NCG).
NCGs enforce a symmetry between the consumption of elements (e.g., network
links) and their relevance for the players: players utilizing an element e through a
strategy S (e.g., a multicast tree) with rate of consumption CeS > 0 experience the
element’s latency amplified by that same factor CeS . Our extension instead allows
a factor ReS , independent of CeS , to express the amplification of the element’s
latency from the players’ perspective, or, in other words, the relevance of element
e for strategy S. We therefore call the extended model non-atomic consumption-
relevance congestion games (NCRCG).
NCRCGs exhibit new phenomena, including multiple Nash equilibria of different
social cost and – even from a worst-case point of view – a dependence of the price
of anarchy on structural parameters not limited to the class of element latency
functions used. It poses new computational challenges.
We prove almost tight lower, upper, and bicriteria bounds for the price of an-
archy for super-homogeneous classes of element latency functions. We show a
positive computational result for affine element latency functions. A summary
of experimental results is given, which suggest that our lower bound is the best
possible.
∗Supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Priority Program 1126, “Algorithmics of Large
and Complex Networks”, Grant Sr7-3.
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Part I.
Model and Known Results
1. Informal Introduction
We give an informal introduction to congestion games and the motivation behind the
NCRCG model, as well as an overview of its new phenomena and our contribution.
We refer to Sec. 2 for all mathematical definitions. Congestion games model competi-
tive situations where individuals, called players, need to occupy elementary resources,
called elements, in specific combinations in order to perform their tasks. The eligible
combinations of elements are called strategies. For instance, elements can be links in
a network, and strategies can be paths or trees that connect certain terminal nodes.
A distribution of all players across available strategies is called an action distribution.
Given an action distribution, then for each element, a quantity called the congestion
captures how severely that element is stressed. The congestion depends on the amount
of players utilizing the element and may also depend on the strategies through which
this utilization takes place. The latter is expressed through element-strategy-dependent
factors called rates of consumption, or, as we will prefer, consumption numbers. The
congestion does not depend on any kind of ‘identity’ of the players.
Each of the elements performs its part of the task with a latency, and that latency
is obtained by applying an element-dependent non-decreasing real function, called the
element latency function, to the congestion. The latency experienced by a player depends
on the latencies of the elements contained in the strategy chosen by that player. In the
NCG model this dependence is again influenced by the elements’ consumption numbers:
the latency experienced by a player using a specific strategy S is the weighted sum
over the element latencies in S, where the elements’ consumption numbers are used as
weights. In contrast, in the NCRCG model, the weights are given by factors called
relevance numbers, which are independent of consumption numbers.
A notion of ‘total latency’, called the social cost, is used to measure the overall perfor-
mance of the system under a given action distribution. Large interest exists in comparing
the social cost and the structure of different particular kinds of action distributions, most
notably those with optimal social cost and those which constitute Nash equilibria, i.e.,
action distributions in which no player has an incentive to change his currently chosen
strategy. The ratio of the social cost of a worst-case Nash equilibrium and an optimal
action distribution is called the price of anarchy. It is a measure of performance-loss
due to non-cooperative behavior.
Congestion games can be used to model non-cooperative routing in networks. Network
links take the role of elements, and paths or trees take the role of strategies. However,
there are limitations as to what routing scenarios can be modeled by NCGs, and these
limitation gave the original motivation to extend the model to NCRCG. Most notably,
modeling multicast routing requires to express the role of a link inside a multicast tree,
which may require the rate of consumption to differ from the relevance. For instance, a
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link close to the source has high relevance for the players since it serves many terminals
– compared to a link that only serves a few. However, if a duplication technique for
realizing the multicast flow is in use, data has to be sent down this link only once,
no matter how many terminals are served. So, the relevance of a link varies under
different multicast trees, depending on where in the tree the link is located – whereas
the consumption, i.e., how steep the congestion increases with the amount of players
utilizing that link, thanks to the duplication technique shows no such dependence and
might be the same for all multicast trees which contain the link.
Allowing consumption numbers to differ from relevance numbers leads to structural
and quantitative changes. Whereas in the NCG model all Nash equilibria have the same
social cost, the NCRCG model allows Nash equilibria with different social cost, and
there can be a large gap between those. With only mild assumptions on the element
latency functions, the social cost is a separable convex function in NCGs. Not so in
NCRCGs, where the social cost function in general is not convex. On the quantitative
side, NCRCGs can exhibit a much higher price of anarchy than NCGs, even if restricted
to the same class of element latency functions. For an NCG with element latency
function drawn from a class L, it was proved by Roughgarden and Tardos [31] that
– under some additional assumptions on L – the price of anarchy is bounded by the
anarchy value α(L), which only depends on L, and is Θ( p
ln p
) for polynomials with non-
negative coefficients and maximum degree p. An extension to that concept was later
given by Correa, Schulz, and Stier Moses [11] using the β(L) parameter. For NCRCGs,
these bounds no longer hold; even for a fixed class of element latency functions, the price
of anarchy can be arbitrarily high.
This article is organized as follows. The rest of Part I gives all mathematical definitions
of the NCRCG model (Sec. 2) and summarizes previous work (Sec. 3). Most importantly,
Sec. 3.2 introduces the β parameter, which is needed later. Part II contains our new
results, summarized in the following paragraphs.
Our Contribution. We identify a new scalar parameter γ, which captures parts
of an NCRCG’s characteristics regarding the price of anarchy (Sec. 5). We establish
bounds containing that new parameter along with the known β := β(L). If element
latency functions are polynomials of degree at most p and non-negative coefficients, the
upper bounds (Sec. 8) are γp+1 and 1
1−γ βγ, depending on the range of γ. We show
corresponding lower bounds for both ranges of γ, which are only one factor of γ away
(Sec. 7).
We discuss different types of multicast and show how they can be modelled as NCRCGs
(Sec. 6). We show that even with strictly increasing element latency functions, Nash
equilibria in multicast are non-unique in general.
On the computational side, we show how mathematical programming can be used and
point out cases that lead to convex programming (Sec. 10). We briefly present experi-
mental results (Sec. 11) suggesting that our lower bounds are, in fact, also upper bounds.
This poses the challenging open task to prove this experimentally gained conjecture.
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2. The NCRCG Model
2.1. Instances
Definition 1. A continuous and non-decreasing function ` : R≥0 −→ R≥0 is called an
element latency function.
The following definition lists all items that characterize a particular instance in the
NCRCG model. It is not a definition of game-theoretic concepts; these will be introduced
in Sec. 2.3.
Definition 2. An instance in the non-atomic consumption-relevance congestion game
model (called shortly “a non-atomic consumption-relevance congestions game”, or “an
NCRCG”) is defined by the following items.
(i) A number m ∈ N. We denote E := [m] (= {1, . . . ,m}), and each number in E
stands for an element.
(ii) For each element e ∈ E an element latency function `e.
(iii) A number N ∈ N. Each number in [N ] stands for a player class.
(iv) For each i ∈ [N ] a number di ∈ R>0, called the demand of player class i. The
demand is to represent a large number of non-cooperative players. The game-
theoretic concept behind this will be explained in Sec. 2.3.
(v) For each i ∈ [N ] a finite set Si, chosen such that S1, . . . ,SN are pairwise disjoint
and each Si has at least cardinality 2. We say that each element in Si stands
for a strategy for player class i. Denote S :=
⋃
i∈[N ] and n := |S|. We will often
identify S = [n] to simplify notation.
(vi) A matrix C ∈ Rm×n≥0 – its entries are called consumption numbers – and a matrix
R ∈ Rm×n≥0 – its entries are called relevance numbers. We say that for e ∈ E and
S ∈ S the number CeS is the consumption of element e under strategy S, and the
number ReS is the relevance of element e for strategy S. We further demand that
neither of the two matrices has a row or a column of only zeros, and that for all
e ∈ E, S ∈ S it holds
CeS = 0 if and only if ReS = 0 .
2.2. Action Distributions, Congestions, Latencies, Social Cost
Define the set of action distributions by
A := {a ∈ Rn≥0;
∑
S∈Si
aS = di ∀i ∈ [N ]} .
An action distribution describes a way of how the demand di of each player class i is
distributed across the strategies in Si. All following notions are relative to a given
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action distribution a. We define the vector of congestions as ~g(a) := C ·a, where the dot





The congestion ge(a) of an element e is a measure of how heavily that element e is
stressed. As can be noticed from the definition, the model allows that an element may
be stressed differently by the same amount of players depending on the strategy through
which these players occupy the element. Recall now that each element e has an element
latency function `e. This function tells us how the element reacts to congestion. We call
`e(ge(a)) the element latency of e.
We have to define how these element latencies are experienced by the players. The
total of players in a player class i can be understood as the interval [0, di]. Each action
distribution describes a possible way of how this interval can be partitioned and the






We call this the strategy latency of S. The vector of all strategy latencies is denoted1
by ~L(a) := (LS(a))S∈S. The following two quantities capture overall characteristics of
the system relative to two action distributions a and b, or just a, respectively. They are








2.3. Game Theory and the Price of Anarchy
We study the non-atomic case of congestion games. That means that the decision of
a ‘single player’ which strategy to take does not change the system (i.e., congestions,
element latencies, or strategy latencies). We therefore do not have to distinguish players
from each other but can subsume them to a real interval [0, di], where di is a measure
of how many players exist. In fact, we never rigorously defined what a ‘single player’ is.
An illustrative example for this is road traffic. The decision of a single driver which
route to take will have virtually no effect on the congestions and latencies of the road
network. However, each driver will only choose such routes that promise minimum
latency. Hence, this system can be considered stable once that all drivers have chosen
minimum-latency routes. Another example is a communication network with a large
1Using simply L(a) instead of ~L(a) and referring to its Sth component by LS(a) would have been
more systematic, but carries the risk for confusion that L might refer to the latency function of a
single strategy – just as we sometimes denote a single element latency function by ` and not by `e
for some e ∈ E. For the same reason, we write ~̀(a) for the vector of all element latencies. We also
write ~g(a) for the vector of all congestions.
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number of users where each user has only got a small amount of data to send or to
receive.
Action distributions in which no ‘single player’ has an incentive to switch strategies
can now be very concisely characterized. The following is the standard definition for
Nash equilibria in non-atomic games, also known as Wardrop equilibria [35].
Definition 3. Let an NCRCG Γ be given. An action distribution a with the following
property is called a Nash equilibrium (abbreviated “N.E.”) for Γ:
∀i ∈ [N ] ∀S, T ∈ Si :
(
aS > 0 =⇒ LS(a) ≤ LT (a)
)
.
The definition says that in a Nash equilibrium, only minimum-latency strategies are
used. A deeper discussion of the non-atomic model itself can be found in [18].
Existence of Nash equilibria is guaranteed under our assumptions; see Thm. 2 in
Sec. 3.1. Since SC is continuous and A is compact, optimal action distributions, i.e.,
with minimal social cost, exist. Their value is denoted by OPT; we always assume that
OPT > 0. We can now define the price of anarchy.
Definition 4. Given an NCRCG, its price of anarchy or coordination ratio is defined
by supa is N.E. SC(a)/OPT. It is sometimes denoted by ρ. By continuity of LS(·), S ∈ S,
we can replace the supremum by a maximum.
We have now defined the NCRCG model. The case C = R coincides with the pre-
viously studied NCG model [31]. The next subsection will make the model clearer.
The reader might also want to take an excursion to Sec. 6 and Sec. 7 for more complex
examples.
2.4. Modeling Unicast Routing
We show how non-cooperative unicast routing can be modeled as an NCRCG, in fact even
as an NCG, since we will only need the case C = R. Let G = (V,E) be a directed multi-
graph modeling a communication network with a continuous, non-decreasing latency
function `e : R≥0 −→ R≥0 for each edge e and N source-sink pairs (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , N .
Each of these N pairs has got a total demand of di units of flow to route from si to ti,
which represents a continuum [0, di] of players. The latency for transmitting one unit of
flow along any path in the graph is the sum of the latencies of the edges in the path.
We can model this as an NCRCG in a straight-forward way. The edges of the graph
together with their latency functions become the elements and element latency functions
of the NCRCG, respectively. The N source-sink pairs correspond to N player classes.
The set of strategies for each player class is a set of si-ti-paths and hence we can take
the corresponding edge-path incidence matrix, which is a 0/1-valued matrix, as the
consumption matrix C as well as the relevance matrix R. A Nash equilibrium now
means that all flow travels along minimum-latency paths.
The set of all si-ti-paths can be exponentially large in the number of nodes |V |. If all
or too large a subset of them shall be eligible for the users’ routing, the matrices C and
R will be too large to be stored explicitly. This can be a problem for the computation of
6
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optimal or Nash flows. For the scenario at hand, i.e., unicast routing, we can resort to
a description on edge level, using flow conservation rules. The corresponding challenge
for the general case is yet open.
3. Previous Work
3.1. Existence of Nash Equilibria
The following characterization of Nash equilibria does not only allow a short argument
for their existence, but will also be essential later when proving bounds on the price of
anarchy.
Theorem 1. An action distribution a is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
SC(a) ≤ SCa(b) ∀b ∈ A . (VAR)
By the theory of variational inequalities, we get the existence guarantee.
Theorem 2. Every NCRCG admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Equation (VAR) is a well-studied variational inequality, and we know that solu-
tions exist since LS(·) is continuous for each S ∈ S and A is compact and convex, see,
e.g., [23, Thm. 1.4] or [16, Thm. 3.1].
3.2. Price of Anarchy: α and β Parameters
The price of anarchy in NCGs, i.e., when C = R, was studied by Roughgarden and
Tardos [31]. We briefly sketch one of the main results. An element latency function
` is called standard if it is differentiable and x 7→ `(x)x is convex. A class of element
latency functions L is called standard if each ` ∈ L is standard and L contains at least
one non-zero function.
Let L be a standard class of element latency functions. For each ` ∈ L define the
marginal cost function `∗ : R≥0 −→ R≥0, x 7→ `′(x)x + `(x), which is the derivative of
x 7→ `(x)x. Then choose a function µ` : R≥0 −→ R≥0 such that `∗(µ`(v)) = `(v) and
µ(v) ≤ v for all v ∈ R≥0. Such a function exists due to a simple argument using the
given convexity of element latency functions. Now define, using the convention 0/0 := 0,





(`(µ`(v))− `(v))µ`(v) + `(v)v
. (1)
It can be shown that this is a well-defined quantity, since it is independent of any
particular choice for (µ`)`∈L. Roughgarden and Tardos [31] show that the price of anarchy
in an NCG with element latency functions drawn from a standard class L is no more
than α(L). That bound is tight from a worst-case point of view.
7
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Although the expression defining the anarchy value may look complicated at first,
anarchy values for many interesting classes of functions can be derived relatively easily,
see [30, Sec. 3.5.2]. For instance, let Poly+(p) be the class of polynomials of degree at
most p and non-negative coefficients. Then α(Poly+(p)) = (1−p(p+1)−1−
1
p )−1 = Θ( p
ln p
).
Correa, Schulz, and Stier Moses [11] show that the concept of anarchy value can
be simplified and generalized at the same time. Let L be a class of element latency








(`(v)− `(x))x . (2)
Monotonicity ensures that there is no division by zero, except 0/0, which is defined to
0. It follows that
(`(v)− `(x))x ≤ β(L) `(v)v ∀v, x ∈ R≥0 ∀` ∈ L . (3)
It is easy to see that always β(L) ≤ 1. In case that L happens to be standard and
α(L) is finite, we have β(L) < 1 and 1
1−β(L) = α(L). Moreover, for any class L of element
latency functions such that β(L) < 1, it is shown in [11] that we can bound the price of
anarchy of an NCG with element latency function drawn from L by 1/(1− β(L)). The
β parameter is easy to derive for many classes of element latency functions, often easier
than the anarchy value directly. We demonstrate that in Lem. 2 and Cor. 1.
3.3. Price of Anarchy: When J ~L is Positive (Semi-)Definite
Perakis [27] studies a setting in some respect more general than ours: ~L may be any
continuously differentiable function Rn −→ Rn. On the other hand, she requires that
the Jacobian J ~L(a) is positive definite (for some results only positive semidefinite) for all
a ∈ A, and, if ~L is non-affine, that a condition called the Jacobian similarity property is
also given. Under these conditions, bounds on the price of anarchy are derived that are
tight from a worst-case point of view. The condition on the definiteness of the Jacobian
may or may not be given in the NCRCG model, and hence these bounds apply to it only
in part. In [17] we compare these bounds experimentally with ours, where applicable.
3.4. Bicriteria Bounds
Bounds of this type have the following form: “a Nash equilibrium is (in terms of social
cost) not worse than an optimum for t times the demand.” For NCGs and t = 2 this was
proved by Roughgarden and Tardos [31]. The statement was later refined to t = 1+β(L)
for NCGs with element latency functions from a class L, see [12] for a short proof.
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3.5. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
In an NCG, all Nash equilibria have the same social cost. A simple proof works by
exploiting the characterization in Thm. 1 to show that element latencies are unique
under Nash equilibria and then to use Prop. 1 from page 11; for details see, e.g., [18].
3.6. Computation
If C = R, then Nash equilibria can be characterized as the optimal solutions to a convex
program. This has been noted by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [3], Dafermos and
Sparrow [14], and Braess [7, 8]; a proof is also given in [18]. The proof is based on the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem (“KKT theorem” for short) and seems to depend crucially
on C = R. Still in the case C = R, a characterization of optima by a convex program
is possible if the real functions x 7→ `e(x)x are convex for each e ∈ E, which is the case
for element latency functions from Poly+(p).
3.7. Bibliographic Notes
We give a short and by far not exhaustive list of related work in roughly chronological
order. Some have already been cited in the preceding outline of known results.
Pigou [28] in 1920 informally introduced what is nowadays known as “Pigou’s Exam-
ple”. It is a simple unicast network exhibiting a high price of anarchy. See, e.g., [18] for
a formal treatment. Nash [24] in 1951 introduced the concept of non-cooperative games
and their equilibria in an atomic model. The term “Nash equilibrium” war subsequently
also used in other models to describe configurations in which no player has an incen-
tive to deviate from the chosen strategy. Wardrop [35] in 1952 studied a non-atomic
model in the context of road traffic. He introduced two principles, which are the base of
our understanding of Nash equilibria and optimal action distributions, respectively. We
quote [35, p. 345]:
(1) The journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than
those that would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route.
(2) The average journey time is a minimum.
The characterization of Nash equilibria as optimal solutions to a convex program was
noted by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [3] in 1956 in the context of road traffic,
Dafermos and Sparrow [14] in 1969, and Braess [7, 8] in 1968. Smith [33] in 1979 studied
existence and uniqueness issues in the Wardrop model and gave the variational inequality
formulation (VAR), which is frequently used in our work.
Rosenthal [29] in 1973 introduced congestion games in an atomic setting. Existence
of equilibria was proved by the use of a potential function. Schmeidler [32] in 1973
introduced non-atomic games with an extended notion of action distributions.
In 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in an atomic setting of routing in a simple
network studied the quantity that would soon later be named the “price of anarchy” [26].
Their model, also known as the “KP model”, and variations of it were subsequently
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addressed, among others, by Czumaj and Vöcking [13] in 2002, Lücking, Mavronicolas,
Monien, Rode, Spirakis, and Vrto [21] in 2003, and Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien,
Rode [20] in 2004.
On the non-atomic side, the dissertation of Roughgarden [30] in 2002 and the work
of Roughgarden and Tardos [31] introduced the anarchy value, which has shown to be a
strong concept for bounding the price of anarchy. Subsequently, in 2004, that concept
was generalized (and simplified) by Correa, Schulz, and Stier Moses [11]. They recently
gave a nice graphical proof [12] for a bound on the price of anarchy. Chau and Sim [9]
in 2003 and Perakis [27] in 2004 studied the price of anarchy in generalized settings.
Results on related non-atomic models were published by, among others, Friedman [15]
in 1996, Blonski [5] in 1999, and Milchtaich [22] in 2004.
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This section collects some notions and simple results that will be used later. Most
importantly, for action distributions a and b, we introduce two more global quantities,








If C = R, then we have ECa(b) = SCa(b), and so EC(a) = SC(a), but not in the general
case.
The next proposition says that Nash equilibria have a simple structure. Let
Λi(a) := min{LS(a); S ∈ Si}
for a ∈ A and i ∈ [N ]. It follows directly from the definition:
Proposition 1. An action distribution a is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all
i ∈ [N ] and all S ∈ Si we have that aS > 0 implies LS(a) = Λi(a). Moreover, the social





We conclude with some technical and notational conventions and remarks:
– The NCRCG model is feasibly defined and interesting even with one player class,
i.e., N = 1. That case is notationally simpler and the reader is encouraged to
think of N = 1 on a first read. In fact, all examples given in this article only have
one player class.
– Let S ∈ S. The set of those elements that have non-zero entries in column S of
matrix C (or, equivalently, R), will – abusing notation – sometimes also be denoted
by S, and we also speak of an element being ‘contained’ in S. Keep in mind that
two strategies with different consumption or relevance numbers can constitute the
same set of elements in this sense. This will be no problem; we will always treat
such strategies as distinct. Moreover, it is sometimes convenient to consider the set
of all strategies which in that sense ‘contain’ a particular element e. We will denote
that as S(e) := {S ∈ S; Ce,S 6= 0}, which is the same as {S ∈ S; Re,S 6= 0}.
– The congestion function ~g is in fact (by a straight-forward extension) defined for
all vectors from Rn≥0 and not only for action distributions. Since element latency
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functions are defined on R≥0, also the functions ~̀, ~L, EC, and SC are defined for
vectors from Rn≥0. We will make use of that in a few places; in particular, we will
use it later when scaling the demands and speaking of actions distributions w.r.t.
those new demands.
5. The New Parameters γ1, γ2, and γ
We introduce new parameters for instances of the NCRCG model. They will play an








; S ∈ S, e ∈ S} .
Their product is denoted γ := γ1γ2.
Recall that we interpret S ∈ S as the set of elements which have non-zero consumption
number in strategy S, or, equivalently, which have non-zero relevance number in strategy
S. Hence there is no division by zero and so these parameters are well-defined and finite.
We have γ1 = γ2 = 1 if C = R, i.e., in the case of an NCG. We always have the product
γ = γ1γ2 ≥ 1.
Scaling. Let ε ∈ R>0 and e ∈ E. If we scale the row of R corresponding to e with ε
and then replace `e by ˜̀e(x) := 1ε`e(x), essentially nothing changes for the game. The
functions ~L and SC are unchanged, and hence so is the set of equilibria, optima, and
their social costs. Also the β parameter does not change; if ˜̀e extends the class of used
element latency functions from L to L̃, we have β(L) = β(L̃). (The function EC changes,
however.) Many of the upper bounds to be established later will be non-decreasing in
the term γ = γ1γ2 and hence it is desirable to reduce that quantity, while preserving
other important properties of the game. We explain in the following how to do so by
scaling. These elaborations are not necessary for understanding most of the rest of this
work and hence can be skipped on a first read.
We call a vector ~ε = (εe)e∈E ∈ Rm>0 a relevance scaling (or here just scaling) and define
R~ε to be the matrix R where row e was multiplied by εe for each e ∈ E. We would
like to find an optimal scaling, i.e., one for that γ, taken w.r.t. R~ε, is minimal over all
possible scalings. It would be no extension to also consider series of scalings, since the
sequential application of two scalings ~ε and ~δ can as well be expressed by the one scaling
(εeδe)e∈E. We call an instance scalable if it has a scaling that strictly reduces γ. So, if
an instance Γ̃ is not scalable, then there is no way to strictly reduce its γ by means of
a scaling. If Γ̃ is the result of scaling an instance Γ with ~ε, then that scaling is optimal
for Γ. For if ~δ was a better scaling for Γ, then the scaling (ε−1e δe)e∈E would reduce the
γ of the non-scalable Γ̃, a contradiction.
12
journal.part_II.tex 2017 2008-12-31 17:08:30Z lki-notebook








; S ∈ S(e)} .
Then, clearly, we have γ1 = maxe∈E γ1(e) and γ2 = maxe∈E γ2(e).
Proposition 2. If the maximum for γ1 and the maximum for γ2 are both attained for
the same element, then the instance is not scalable.
Proof. Let e ∈ E such that γi = γi(e), i = 1, 2. Let ~ε ∈ Rm>0 be a relevance scaling and
γ̃i(·), γ̃i, γ̃, i = 1, 2, the ‘γ’-values w.r.t. R~ε. We have γ̃1(e) = 1εeγ1(e) and γ̃2(e) = εeγ2(e).
Since for γ̃1 and γ̃2, the maximum is taken over all elements, these values cannot be
smaller than γ̃1(e) and γ̃2(e), respectively. It follows γ̃ = γ̃1γ̃2 ≥ 1εeγ1(e)εeγ2(e) =
γ1(e)γ2(e) = γ.
The following procedure constructs an optimal relevance scaling.
1.) Initialize ~ε := (1, . . . , 1) and R′ := R. All ‘γ’-quantities in the following are taken
w.r.t. R′.
2.) Determine whether there is e ∈ E such that γ1 = γ1(e) and γ2 = γ2(e).
If so, then stop.




b) Find T ∈ S(e) with γ1(e) = CeTR′eT .




5.) Multiply row e of R′ by εe and replace R′ with the resulting matrix.
6.) Goto 2.).
Proposition 3. The above procedure constructs an optimal relevance scaling in at most
m iterations.
Proof. By Prop. 2, the stopping criterion ensures that upon termination, the given rele-
vance scaling is optimal. Hence it is left to show that the procedure stops after at most
m iterations.
In each iteration, the row e responsible for γ2 is scaled down as much as possible,
i.e., such that the new γ1(e) will just not exceed (the old) γ1; note that γ1 does not
change during the whole procedure. This makes the new γ1(e) equal to γ1, thus γ1 is
now attained for row e.
No row will be treated twice, for if a row e was chosen a second time, we would have
γ1(e) = γ1 and, since e was chosen again, also γ2(e) = γ2, so that the procedure would
have stopped before that. Hence, the procedure stops after at most m iterations.
13
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For illustration, we note that rows are indeed scaled down, since εe < 1 in each iteration
by the properties of γ1. Moreover, we note that in each iteration, there are two possible
outcomes of scaling the row e. Either is γ2 still attained for e and the procedure termi-
nates. Or the row in which γ2 is attained has changed to some f 6= e. Since only row e
was modified, γ2(f) is lesser or equal to the γ2 from before the iteration.
Scaling rows of the consumption matrix C is also possible. If a row e of C is scaled
by δ ∈ R>0 then we have to replace `e by x 7→ `e(1δx). However, for the sake of reducing
γ = γ1γ2 it does not matter whether we scale rows of R, or of C, or of both. For the
combination of a relevance scaling ~ε and consumption scaling ~δ can be transformed into
an equivalent relevance scaling: set λe := εe/δe for each e ∈ E. Then scaling R with ~λ
has the same effect on γ as the combination of ~ε used on R and ~δ used on C.
6. Multicast Routing, a First Lower Bound, and Non-Uniqueness of Nash
Equilibrium
The initial motivation for the NCRCG model comes from multicast routing. In multicast
routing, we are given N sources si, i ∈ [N ], each of them associated with ki ∈ N≥1
sinks t1i , . . . , t
ki
i . For each i ∈ [N ], a demand of di has to be routed from si to each sink
t1i , . . . , t
ki
i simultaneously. Again, we assume the demand to represent a continuum [0, di]
of players. The underlying structure, as in unicast routing, is a directed multigraph
(V,E) where each edge e ∈ E has a latency function `e. Let us fix one i ∈ N for a
moment. To realize the desired routing for some fraction of the demand, we have to
choose ki paths P := {P1, . . . , Pki}, where Pj connects si with t
j
i for each j ∈ [ki]. Such
a set P will constitute a strategy. Denote P(e) := {P ∈ P ; e ∈ P}. Hence, to model
this as an NCRCG, matrices C and R have to somehow represent all eligible choices of
such collections of paths.
Before we can write out C and R, further decisions have to be made. There are at
least two ways to realize a flow using a strategy P . One is to realize a flow in the usual
sense, obeying the Kirchhoff rule: the amount of flow entering a node is exactly the
amount of flow leaving the node. This will be called a conservation flow. When using
conservation flows, the consumption number of an edge e regarding strategy P is |P(e)|,
i.e., the number of sinks served via e. A smarter way to realize P is to exploit the
fact that we deal with data to be routed. Unlike physical flows, data can be duplicated
virtually without cost, provided that the nodes in the network offer such a feature.
Thus the same data has to be sent down an edge only once, no matter how many sinks
are served by this. We call this duplication flows. When using duplication flows, the
consumption number of an edge regarding P is 1 if it is contained in some path from P ,
and 0 otherwise.
We now consider relevance numbers. There are many different reasonable ways in
which the latency of a collection of paths P , i.e., the strategy latency, could be un-
derstood; we point out four of them in [2]. Two interesting ones can be modeled by
assigning relevance numbers to edges. In the first model, we would simply sum up the
edge latencies of all edges involved, hence the relevance number of an edge is 1 if that
14
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edge is contained in some path from P , and 0 otherwise. We call this edge-based strategy
latency. In the other model, we consider an edge more relevant if it serves many sinks.
We will set its relevance number to |P(e)| for that model2 and refer to this model by
the term path-based strategy latency, since it is equivalent to taking the sum of the la-
tencies of all paths in P , where the latency of a path is the sum of the latencies of the
edges (exactly as in unicast routing). For a motivation, think of the source as a service
provider and the terminals as customers which pay according to the quality of service.
A higher latency means a loss of income for the service provider, which is proportional
to the number of customers that experience that higher latency. The provider will hence
consider an edge more important if it serves many customers.
Combining conservation flows with path-based strategy latency, or combining dupli-
cation flows with edge-based strategy latency, yields C = R, and is hence covered by
previous analysis. However, combining conservation flows with edge-based latency, or
combining duplication flows with path-based strategy latency, yields C 6= R in general.
We will now focus on the latter combination, which we consider most important for
applications.
6.1. Lower Bound and Non-Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Consider the multicast instance from Fig. 1. We have one source, two sinks, and four
strategies. Each strategy consists of two paths. For instance, strategy 1 consists of the
paths (1, 3) and (1, 6); numbers denoting edges. Edges 1 and 2 have element latency
function x 7→ xp and edges 3 to 6 have element latency function x 7→ θx, where p ∈ N≥1
and θ ∈ R≥0 are fixed parameters. Matrices C and R are as follows. Recall that
strategies correspond to columns and elements correspond to rows. We have
C =

1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
 and R =

2 0 1 1
0 2 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
 .
It follows that γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 2. We write out the strategy latencies for all four
strategies for some arbitrary action distribution a:
L1(a) = 2`1(g1(a)) + `3(g3(a)) + `6(g6(a)) = 2g1(a)
p + θg3(a) + θg6(a)
L2(a) = 2`2(g2(a)) + `5(g5(a)) + `4(g4(a)) = 2g2(a)
p + θg5(a) + θg4(a)
L3(a) = `1(g1(a)) + `3(g3(a)) + `2(g2(a)) + `4(g4(a))
= g1(a)
p + g2(a)
p + θg3(a) + θg4(a)
L4(a) = `1(g1(a)) + `6(g6(a)) + `2(g2(a)) + `5(g5(a))
= g1(a)
p + g2(a)
p + θg5(a) + θg6(a)
2Many other expressions involving |P(e)| would also be reasonable, e.g., |P(e)|c for some c > 0. All
such variations can be expressed in the NCRCG model.
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(d) Strategy 4: {(1, 6), (2, 5)}
Figure 1: Multicast instance admitting multiple Nash equilibria with different conges-
tions and different social cost. Link numbers are given in boxes, p ∈ N≥1 and
θ ∈ R≥0 are fixed parameters. The instance is shown four times to display all
four strategies.
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Let the demand be d = 1. It follows that a∗ := (1/2, 1/2, 0, 0) and a′ := (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
are both Nash equilibria, since they induce the following congestions:
ge(a
∗) = 1/2 ∀e ∈ {1, . . . , 6} ,
ge(a
′) = 1 ∀e ∈ {1, 2} and ge(a′) = 1/2 ∀e ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} ,
and so LS(a∗) = (1/2)p−1 + θ and LS(a′) = 2 + θ for all S ∈ {1, . . . 4}. They have
different social cost, namely SC(a∗) = (1/2)p−1 + θ and SC(a′) = 2 + θ, and also induce
different element latencies. This is an example that in the case C 6= R, there may be
Nash equilibria of different social cost and different congestions, even though all element
latency functions are strictly increasing (consider case θ > 0).






= Ω(2p) = Ω(γp2) for θ = O(2
1−p).
This not only breaks the anarchy value bound, which would have been O( p
ln p
), but also
shows a huge gap between the social costs of different Nash equilibria.
A similar example can be constructed with k sinks, for any number k ∈ N, yielding
γ2 = k and a lower bound of Ω(γp2) = Ω(kp). Details for that construction are given
in [2].
7. General Lower Bound on the Price of Anarchy
Using the construction from [2], we can have multicast instances with a price of anarchy
at least Ω(γp2) for any desired γ2, using element latency functions from Poly
+(p). We
can extend that using the flexibility of general NCRCGs and also give a special bound
in case of small γ.
Theorem 3. (i) Let p ∈ N≥1 and c, r ∈ R≥1. There exist NCRCGs with element
latency functions only from Poly+(p) with γ1 = c and γ2 = r such that the price of
anarchy is at least γp = (γ1γ2)p.
(ii) Let p ∈ N≥1 and c, r ∈ R≥1 such that cr < (p + 1)
1
p . There exist NCRCGs with
element latency functions only from Poly+(p) with γ1 = c and γ2 = r such that the
price of anarchy is at least
1




The significance of the second lower bound will later be recognized when we notice
that β(Poly+(p)) = p(p + 1)−1−
1
p , and hence the lower bound is 1/(1 − γβ(Poly+(p))),
being a natural extension to the known anarchy value bound for NCGs.
Both lower bounds from Thm. 3 have an upper-bound counterpart which is no more
than a factor of γ away and will be given in Thm. 4.
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Proof of Thm. 3. Part (i). Different kinds of instances can be used to show this worst-
case lower bound. We give one that, provided c, r ∈ N, only uses integral numbers in C
and R, and only integral coefficients in the polynomials. Let N := 1, d := 1, m := r,
and n := m+ 1 and define:
C :=








Empty entries are 0. Then γ1 = c and γ2 = r, and the instance is not scalable. Let each
element latency function be x 7→ xp and a := (0, . . . , 0, 1) and a∗ := ( 1
m
, . . . , 1
m
, 0). Then
a is a Nash equilibrium, since




cp = mcp = rcp .
We have its social cost
SC(a) = rcpd = rcp . (6)
For a∗ we have the following (showing as a side-product that it happens to be a Nash
equilibrium as well):



































It follows that SC(a)/SC(a∗) = rcp rp−1 = (cr)p = (γ1γ2)p = γp.
Part (ii). We extend the example from part (i) by a strategy with index r + 2 with
constant latency Lr+2(·) = rcp. By essentially the same argument as before, a :=
(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium with social cost SC(a) = rcp, just note that the





, . . . ,
c
(p+ 1)1/p
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Then by the assumption on cr, we have an action distribution. So, we follow the idea
of the first lower bound, but additionally take advantage of the fact that we can move


































1− rc ((p+ 1)−
1






1− rc ((p+ 1)(p+ 1)−1−
1






1− rc (p+ 1)−1−
1























8. Upper Bound on the Price of Anarchy
Recall the characterization of Nash equilibria given in Thm. 1. We can apply that to
prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy, inspired by a basic idea from [11]. We first
relate (mixed) total element cost to (mixed) social cost.
Proposition 4. Let a, b ∈ A. Then we have
1
γ2
SCa(b) ≤ ECa(b) ≤ γ1SCa(b) .























3The exact setting was obtained by introducing a parameter x, and setting a∗ = (x, . . . , x, 0, 1− rx),
and then choosing an x with SC(a∗) minimal under the constraint that a∗ is an action distribution.
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For the rest of this section, we will treat NCRCGs with super-homogeneous element
latency functions.
Definition 5. Let s : (0, 1] −→ (0,∞) such that s(1) = 1.
(i) An element latency function ` is called s-super-homogeneous if `(εx) ≥ s(ε)`(x)
for all ε ∈ (0, 1] and all x ∈ R≥0.
(ii) An element latency function class L is called s-super-homogeneous if each ` ∈ L is
s-super-homogeneous.
(iii) Define s̄ : [1,∞) −→ (0,∞), t 7→ s(t−1)−1.
Remark 1. The element latency function ` is s-super-homogeneous if and only if it is
s̄-sub-homogeneous, i.e.,
`(tx) ≤ s̄(t)`(x) ∀t ≥ 1 ∀x ∈ R≥0 . (7)
Proof. If ` is s-super-homogeneous, we have `(x) = `(t−1tx) ≥ s(t−1)`(tx) = s̄(t)−1`(tx)
for all t ≥ 1 and all x ∈ R≥0, so ` is s̄-sub-homogeneous. If, on the other hand, ` fulfills
(7) then `(x) = `(ε−1εx) ≤ s̄(ε−1)`(εx) = s(ε)−1`(εx) for all ε ∈ (0, 1] and all x ∈ R≥0,
so ` is s-super-homogeneous.
For instance, the classes Poly+(p) are s-super-homogeneous for s(ε) = εp (and also
s-sub-homogeneous).
Lemma 1. Let L be an s-super-homogeneous class of element latency functions. Let
an NCRCG be given with element latency functions drawn from L. Let a, b ∈ Rn≥0 and
t ≥ 1. Then
ECa(b) ≤ 1
t
β(L)EC(a) + s̄(t)EC(b) .
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= β(L)EC(a) + ts̄(t)EC(b) .
Dividing by t yields the claimed inequality.
Following [11] we derive a bound on β(L) for super-homogeneous classes.
Lemma 2 ([11, Lem. 4.1]). Let L be an s-super-homogeneous class of element latency



















































A bound follows for (ε 7→ εp)-super-homogeneous classes, e.g., Poly+(p).
Corollary 1 (cf. [11, Cor. 4.4]). Let L be an (ε 7→ εp)-super-homogeneous element la-






ε− εp+1 by Lem. 2
21
journal.part_II.tex 2017 2008-12-31 17:08:30Z lki-notebook
= (p+ 1)−
1
p − (p+ 1)−1−
1
p real calculus
= (p+ 1)(p+ 1)−1−
1
p − (p+ 1)−1−
1
p
= ((p+ 1)− 1)(p+ 1)−1−
1
p = p(p+ 1)−1−
1
p .
Remark 2. The bound in Cor. 1 is the best possible as shown by Pigou’s example, see,
e.g., [18] and the references therein.
The following is our main result in this section.
Theorem 4. (i) The price of anarchy in an NCRCG with element latency functions
drawn from an s-super-homogeneous class L for which β := β(L) < 1 holds is no
more than {
1




1−βγs̄(γ)} for γ < 1/β
.
(ii) The price of anarchy in an NCRCG with element latency functions drawn from
Poly+(p) is no more than{




1−γ βγ if γ ≤ (1 + p)
1
p
, where β = p(p+ 1)−1−
1
p .
Let us briefly discuss these bounds before starting the proof. The bound 1
1−βγs̄(γ) is
universal; it holds for all γ and all classes L of element latency functions, provided only
that β = β(L) < 1. The bound 1
1−γ βγ is only proved for small γ and is sometimes better
than the universal one, depending on the function s̄. The second part of the theorem
treats the case of polynomial element latency functions, i.e., from Poly+(p) for a fixed p.
We distinguish between large and small γ. Large γ start at (1 + p)
1
p , and it will become
clear from the proof why we chose that threshold. The bound for large γ improves on
the universal one by a factor of 1/(1− β), where β = p(p+ 1)−1−
1
p , as we know well by
now. The bound for small γ is a corollary from the bounds in part (i) of the theorem.




p+1}. However, real calculus shows that the
first expression is always upper-bounded by the second one and hence the first is the
better bound.
Proof of Thm. 4. Let a be a Nash equilibrium and b be any action distribution. For all
t ≥ 1 we have
SC(a) ≤ SCa(b) by Thm. 1





















Key observation: if t ≥ 1 is chosen such that 1− γ 1
t








All bounds follow from the key observation by an appropriate choice of t.
• For the first bound of part (i), i.e., the universal bound, choose t := γ and note
that t ≥ 1 holds then, as well es 1− γ 1
t
β = 1− β > 0 since β < 1.
• To prove the second bound of part (i), let γ < 1/β, hence γβ < 1. We only have to
show the 1
1−γ βγ bound, since the other one is the universal bound. Choose t := 1.
Then 1−γ 1
t
β = 1−γβ > 0, and the bound follows from the key observation, since
s̄(1) = 1.
• To prove the first bound from part (ii), choose t := γ (p + 1)−
1
p , which is ≥ 1 by
assumption on γ, and also implies
1− γ 1
t




p = 1− p
p+ 1
> 0 .












• For the second bound from part (ii) we just have to note that








hence γ < 1/β, and invoke the second bound from part (i).
Remark 3. The bounds in Thm. 4(ii) are tight up to a factor of γ by Thm. 3.
When establishing the upper bound from Thm. 4 for a concrete instance with non-
decreasing s̄ (as it is the case for polynomials), we can first scale that instance in order
to minimize γ, as described in Sec. 5. As mentioned before, it can be shown easily that
if that scaling extends the class of element latency functions used from L to some L̃, we
have β(L) = β(L̃). Since all bounds are non-increasing in γ and, for part (ii), we have
1
1−γ βγ = γ
p+1 if γ = (1 + p)
1
p , the bounds can only improve by the scaling.
The bounds for the scaled instance also hold for the original one. So, in particular, it
is not necessary to ‘really’ scale the instance – if, e.g., further algorithmic tasks shall be
carried out with the instance, we can well work with the original one. This is how we
proceeded in our experimental studies.
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9. Bicriteria Bound
The next theorem says that a Nash equilibrium is not worse in terms of social cost than
an optimum for (1 + β(L))γ times the demand. It is hence a natural extension to the
known bicriteria bound for NCGs, which use a scaling of the demand by 1 + β(L).
Theorem 5. Let Γ be an NCRCG with element latency functions drawn from the s-
super-homogeneous class L. Let a be a Nash equilibrium for Γ and b an action dis-
tribution for the NCRCG resulting from Γ by a multiplication of each demand di by
(1 + β(L))γ. Then SC(a) ≤ SC(b).
Proof. Let t, u ≥ 1 to be specified more precisely later. Let b be an action distribution
for the demands scaled up by u. Then 1
u
b is an action distribution for Γ and hence

































To receive ‘SC(a) ≤ SC(b)’, we need the φ(u, t) ≥ 1. Since φ(·, t) is strictly increasing








Choosing t := 1, we are forced to choose u := (1 + β(L))γ and get (8); recall that
s̄(1) = 1. Note that for the case s̄(t) = tp, this choice of t is optimal, since for such s̄
the right-hand side in (8), increases with t.
Theorem 6. Consider element latency functions from Poly+(p). The scaling factor
(1 +β(L))γ in the previous theorem is the best possible up to a factor of (1 +β(L))γ
1
p+1 .
Proof. Recall the first example from the proof of Thm. 3, displayed in (5) on page 18.
We have parameters c, r, p ∈ N≥1, m = r, n = m+ 1, element latency functions x 7→ xp,
and as shown in that proof, we can construct a Nash equilibrium a with social cost
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there is an action distribution b := (u/m, . . . , u/m, 0) ∈ Rm+1≥0 . Let us compute SC(b).
We have



































= r1−p(cr)p = rcp .
Hence we have to scale the demands up by at least u = γ1−
1
p+1 in order to have SC(a) ≤
SC(b′) for all action distributions b′ that is admissible for the scaled demands.
10. Computation
Convex programs play an important role for the computation of optima and Nash equilib-
ria. Convex programs can be solved in polynomial time up to an arbitrarily small error,
given some mild additional properties. Some of the practical methods require certain
boundedness conditions, smoothness and efficiently computable first and second order
derivatives of the functions involved. See, e.g., [4, 6, 25] for comprehensive treatments
of convex optimization. The case of a convex quadratic function and linear constraints
is polynomially solvable with the ellipsoid algorithm [19] or, up to an arbitrarily small
error, by interior-point algorithms [4, 6, 25]. We will encounter that special case later
with affine element latency functions, since then SC is a quadratic function.
Computation of Nash equilibria and optima is hindered by two changes that occur
when we switch from NCGs to NCRCGs:
• SC is not necessarily a convex function anymore;
• there seems to be no way to use the KKT theorem to recognize Nash equilibria as
optima of a convex program (cf. Sec. 3.6).
We will address these concerns separately below. Before, we state a fact about EC. By
Prop. 4, an algorithm that minimizes EC yields a γ-approximation for OPT. This is
especially interesting if x 7→ `e(x)x is a convex function for all e ∈ E, since then EC is a
convex function, even a separable one if considered a function of the congestions. How-
ever, it is clear that such an approach can only be of limited use since the computation
does not involve the matrix R.
10.1. Convexity and Non-Convexity of SC; Computation of Optima
Let all element latency functions be twice continuously differentiable on R>0, which
implies that SC is a twice continuously differentiable function on Rn>0 with its Hessian
25
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If all element latency functions are affine, say, `e(x) = θex+ τe with θe, τe ∈ R≥0, then









A real-valued, twice differentiable function of multiple real variables is convex on a
convex open set if and only if its Hessian is positive semidefinite in every point of that
set. We cannot apply that directly to SC, since the relevant set, namely A, is not
open (it is convex, though). If ∇2 SC is positive semidefinite in every point of some
open convex set U ⊆ Rn>0 such that A ⊆ U , then SC is convex on U and hence, by
continuity, also on A. The converse, however, does not hold, and so a test based on this
can deliver false positives, i.e., categorize SC as non-convex when, in fact, it is convex








, let the one element
have latency function x 7→ x, and a demand d = 1 be given. Then, SC is convex on





is not positive semidefinite; it
has got the negative eigenvalue 4−
√
20.
For an exact test, we have to use the projected Hessian instead. Details are explained
in the following. Let the strategies be ordered such that strategies from one player class
are grouped together and these groups arranged in the order i = 1, . . . , N . Set ni := |Si|
for each i ∈ [N ]. So, in our ordering the first n1 strategies are from player class 1, the
next n2 strategies are from player class 2, etc. Let S′i be the set Si without the last




i similar to that on
S, i.e., the first n1− 1 strategies in S′ are from player class 1, the next n2− 1 strategies
are from player class 2, etc. Define the affine mapping T and its matrix MT ∈ Rn×(n−N)
as shown in Sec.A in the appendix. The version for N = 1 is as follows:


















However, in the following we will always refer to the general version found in the
appendix. For each i ∈ [N ] we have the following: ni−1 real numbers are mapped by T
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to ni real numbers such that the sum of the latter is always di. Define the set of reduced
action distributions
A′ := {v ∈ Rn−N>0 ;
∑
S∈S′i
vS < di ∀i ∈ [N ]} .
This is an open convex set in Rn−N . The image of A′ under T is contained in Rn>0 and
it consists of all action distributions save those which have one or more zero entries. It
follows that T (A′) = A. By continuity of SC, we hence know that SC is convex on T (A′)
if and only if it is convex on A. Since T is an affine mapping, SC is convex on T (A′) if
and only if SC ◦ T is convex on A′. The latter is the case if and only if ∇2(SC ◦ T )(v) is
positive semidefinite for all v ∈ A′, since A′ is open.
We know from calculus that for twice continuously differentiable functions h : U −→
Rn and f : V −→ R, with h(U) ⊆ V , U ⊆ Rr, that for all v ∈ U we have






where h∗ji(v) = (∂j∂ihk(v))k=1,...,n for each i, j ∈ [n] is the vector of second partial
derivatives ∂j∂i of all component functions of h at v, and Jh(v) denotes the Jacobian of
h at v. Applying that to f := SC and h := T yields
∇2(SC ◦ T )(v) = M⊥T · ∇2 SC(T (v)) ·MT , (10)
since all second-order partial derivatives of T vanish. The matrix given by (10) is also
known as the projected Hessian. If element latency functions are affine, we have constant
Hessian for SC as shown in (9), making it easy to check the projected Hessian for being
positive semidefinite on A′. We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let all element latency functions be twice continuously differentiable (on
R>0). Then SC is convex on A if and only if the projected Hessian (10) is positive
semidefinite for all v ∈ A′. If all element latency functions are affine, the projected Hes-
sian is independent of v and hence can be checked efficiently4 for being positive semidef-
inite on A′.
Finally, if SC is convex, optima are characterized by a convex program:
min SC(a)
s.t. a ∈ A
(OPT NLP)
10.2. Computation of Nash Equilibria
Recall that in the case C = R, Nash equilibria can be characterized by a convex pro-
gram, see Sec. 3.6 for references. A technically different approach can be taken in the
4Up to the numerical inaccuracies involved when, e.g., computing eigenvalues.
27
journal.part_II.tex 2017 2008-12-31 17:08:30Z lki-notebook
general case, also leading to a characterization of Nash equilibria as optimal solutions
to minimization problems, which are not necessarily convex, however.
Theorem 8. A vector a ∈ Rn≥0 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists λ ∈ RN
such that (a, λ) is an optimal solution to the following mathematical program.5
min SC(a)− λ · d
s.t. a ∈ A
λ ∈ RN
λi ≤ LS(a) ∀S ∈ Si ∀i ∈ [N ]
(Nash NLP)




















λidi = λ · d .
From this inequality we also immediately deduce that for a feasible (a, λ) we have ob-
jective function value 0 if and only if
• LS(a) = λi for all S ∈ Si and all i ∈ [N ] which have aS > 0,
• and, trivially (due to feasibility), LS(a) ≥ λi for all S ∈ Si and all i ∈ [N ].
The claim now follows from Prop. 1.
If LS(·) is concave for all S ∈ S and SC is convex, then (Nash NLP) is a convex
program. If we have affine element latency functions, then the constraints of (Nash NLP)
are linear and the objective function is quadratic. If element latency functions are
affine and SC is convex, then we essentially6 have a linearly constrained convex quadratic
program, which is solvable in polynomial time by the ellipsoid algorithm [19] or, up
to an arbitrarily small error, by interior-point algorithms [4, 6, 25]. But even in cases
where we do not have such a nice method available, the approach via (Nash NLP) is
not entirely hopeless; a vector returned by some algorithm (e.g., some solver for general
non-linear programs) can be checked easily for being a Nash equilibrium by considering
5By Thm. 1 and Thm. 8 we have that the set of solutions to (VAR) coincides with the set of optimal
solutions to (Nash NLP). A more general result than this was proved earlier by Aghassi, Bertsimas,
and Perakis [1], using stronger tools, including LP-duality.
6The objective function of a convex quadratic program is usually specified as
v 7→ v⊥Av+b⊥v, with A being a symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix, and b a vector. (11)
If `e(x) = θex+ τe with θe, τe ∈ R≥0, for each e ∈ E, and θ := diag(θe)e∈E ∈ Rm×m, τ := (τe)e∈E ,
then SC(a) = a⊥(R⊥θC)⊥a + (R⊥τ)⊥a. As we have seen before, ∇2 SC = R⊥θC + (R⊥θC)⊥, and
so also R⊥θC, needs not to be positive semidefinite, even if SC is convex. However, if SC is convex,
we can always bring it into the form of (11) using the affine mapping T . The projected Hessian
times 12 becomes the matrix A, the vector b has to be chosen accordingly, and instead of A we use
{v ∈ Rn−N≥0 ;
∑
S∈S′i
vS ≤ di ∀i ∈ [N ]}.
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the corresponding objective value of (Nash NLP) or by checking directly whether the
solution fulfills the definition of Nash equilibrium. So we can at least always determine
whether some proposed solution is in fact correct.
Extreme Nash Equilibria. Nash equilibria need not to be unique, and two different
equilibria may have different social cost, as we have seen before. We add, for some
numbers c0 ≤ c1, the additional linear constraint c0 ≤ λ · d ≤ c1 resulting in the
following mathematical program.
min SC(a)− λ · d
s.t. a ∈ A
λ ∈ RN
λi ≤ LS(a) ∀S ∈ Si ∀i ∈ [N ]
c0 ≤ λ · d ≤ c1
(Nash NLP’)
If we can check feasibility of (Nash NLP’), we can check whether there exists a Nash
equilibrium with social cost between c0 and c1. If we can, in case of feasibility, solve
(Nash NLP’), we can find a Nash equilibrium with social cost between c0 and c1. For
affine element latency functions and convex SC, this is both possible: the constraints are
linear then and the objective function is convex quadratic.
Let ρ̃ denote an upper bound on the price of anarchy, and assume that we know OPT.
Then we know that all Nash equilibria have social cost in the interval [OPT, ρ̃OPT].
Using binary search, we can hence compute a worst or a best equilibrium with an absolute
error7 of ε by solving at most dlog2(1ε (ρ̃− 1) OPT)e instances of (Nash NLP’), provided
the latter is practical. We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. (i) Optima and Nash equilibria are characterized by the mathematical
programs (OPT NLP) and (Nash NLP), respectively.
(ii) Let c0 ≤ c1. If (Nash NLP’) is feasible and has optimal value 0, it characterizes
all Nash equilibria with social cost between c0 and c1. If (Nash NLP’) is infeasible
or has optimal value > 0, no Nash equilibria with social cost between c0 and c1
exist.
(iii) Let ρ̃ be an upper bound on the price of anarchy. We can compute8 a worst or
best Nash equilibrium up to an error of ε (and possibly an additional error intro-
duced when solving the involved mathematical programs) by solving one instance
7Meaning that the Nash equilibrium found shall have social cost at least SC(a)−ε or at most SC(a)+ε,
where a is a worst or a best Nash equilibrium, respectively, depending on whether we wish to
approximate a worst or a best one.
8This statement is to be understood relative to the practicability of solving (OPT NLP) and
(Nash NLP’). It is not intended to make any claim that we actually can solve these programs,
it merely states the number of different instances that would be needed to be solved. See also
statements (iv) and (v).
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of (OPT NLP), and by solving or showing to be infeasible at most dlog2(1ε (ρ̃ −
1) OPT)e instances of (Nash NLP’).
(iv) If LS(·) is concave for all S ∈ S and SC is convex, then both (OPT NLP) and
(Nash NLP) are convex programs.
(v) If element latency functions are affine and SC is convex, then both (OPT NLP)
and (Nash NLP) are linearly constrained convex quadratic programs.
In total, we have a satisfactory computational result for affine element latency func-
tions: by Thm. 7 we can check whether SC is convex or not, and if so, we can compute
optima and extreme Nash equilibria (up to a small error) by convex quadratic program-
ming.
Practicability may, however, depend on the number of variables – and so for our
programs in particular on the number of strategies. If, e.g., the set of strategies was to
enumerate all possible multicast path collections (or trees) in a network, this could be
exponential in the number of links. Efficiently handling such applications is future work.
11. Brief Summary of Experimental Results and Conjecture
We conducted extensive experimental studies of the price of anarchy in NCRCGs using
the computational results from the previous section. We used our own implementation,
which utilizes existing NLP solvers [10, 34] as back-ends. It is beyond the scope of
this article to describe the experiments or the deployed random model in detail, and so
we refer to [17] for all details instead. Experiments were done on randomly generated
instances with polynomial element latency functions. Effort was put into creating a
variety of different kinds of instances. Although we treated several million instances
with p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for none of them we could prove a price of anarchy exceeding that of
Thm. 3(ii) by more than 1% for p ∈ {1, 2} or by 4% for p = 3. Attributing the 1% and
4% to numerical inaccuracies, we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture. The price of anarchy in an NCRCG with element latency functions drawn
from Poly+(p) is no more than{




1−γ β if γ ≤ (1 + p)
1
p
, where β = p(p+ 1)−1−
1
p .
It is worth noting that the finer facets of this conjecture were obtained during the
experiments. The starting point was a conjecture inspired by the universal bound from
Thm. 4 directly applied to polynomial element latency functions, namely we conjectured
an upper bound of simply 1
1−βγ
p. Most of the subsequent refinements that lead to Thm. 3,
Thm. 4, and finally to the above conjecture were inspired by experimental results.
Fig. 2 shows results for random instances and affine latency functions. A dot is drawn
for each instance and positioned horizontally according to its bound given by the conjec-
ture (using a γ obtained from an optimal scaling) and positioned vertically according to
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Figure 2: Scatter plot for random instances with affine element latency functions, i.e.,
p = 1. A dot is drawn for each instance and positioned horizontally according
to its bound given by the conjecture and positioned vertically according to the
observed price of anarchy. A line marks the conjectured bound. Only those
with γ smaller than the maximum observed price of anarchy were selected from
the data set, for the sake of a better horizontal scale, resulting in approximately
650,000 instances shown out of a total of 864,000. Note that several dots are
close to or on the line, but none above it. Plots and tables for larger data sets
are given in [17].
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the observed price of anarchy. A red line marks the conjectured bound. A dot that was
clearly positioned to the upper left of that line would have constituted a counter-example
to the conjecture. Some dots are positioned vertically below 1, which means that the
optimum was not found and a Nash equilibrium had lower social cost than the false
optimum. These dropout dots disappear when we remove instances with non-convex SC
from the data set.
We speak of observed price of anarchy here meaning the value SC(a)/SC(b), where a is
the Nash equilibrium with highest social cost which we could find by means of trying to
solve (Nash NLP’) with different c0, either in a binary search scheme or by a successively
increasing c0 by a small increment, and b is the action distribution with the smallest
social cost which we could find by means of trying to solve (OPT NLP). The observed
price of anarchy is a lower bound on the price of anarchy; if we can treat the involved
NLPs optimally or close to optimality, it equals the price of anarchy or is close to it
depending on the accuracy of the NLP solutions.
The random instances presented in Fig. 2 were generated as follows: The number of
elements was fixed to m = 4, the demand to d = 1 (we used only one player class), the
number of strategies ranges in n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9}, consumption numbers were drawn
from the interval [1.0, 9.0], and relevance numbers were restricted to different intervals
in different series of the experiment: [1.0, 1.0], [1.0, 5.0], or [1.0, 9.0]. Choosing the most
restrictive range for relevance numbers, i.e., [1.0, 1.0] has shown to generate the most
instances with an observed price of anarchy close to or on the conjectured bound. In




random coefficients θ0, . . . , θp were used, and for the other half, simply `(x) = xp was
used.
12. Open Problems
Challenges for future work mainly point in three directions from here.
1. Prove or disprove the conjectured upper bound on the price of anarchy.
2. Study the price of stability, i.e., infa is N.E. SC(a)/OPT. Recall that compared to
the NCG model, the NCRCG model introduces the novelty of Nash equilibria of
different social cost and hence the price of stability may differ from the price of
anarchy. As seen in Sec. 6.1 the gap between price of anarchy and price of stability
may be exponential in p for element latency functions from Poly+(p). It appears
that the basic tool, the variational inequality (VAR), which characterizes Nash
equilibria, is insufficient for bounding the price of stability. New methods will be
required, which hopefully might also yield a proof for the conjectured bound on
the price of anarchy.
3. Develop algorithms to compute optima and Nash equilibria in certain non-quadratic
or non-convex cases. Our experimental results (given in detail in [17]) can serve
as a benchmark for future experimental studies: will a new algorithm be able to
deliver a substantially larger fraction of instances with observed price of anarchy
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near to the conjectured bound for the same random model? Will a new algorithm
succeed in disproving the conjecture by the discovery of a counter-example?
Moreover, there is an additional computational challenge in the case that the
number of strategies is too large in order to store C or R explicitly in memory
or to treat mathematical programs that contain one variable for each strategy. In
unicast routing, if all paths shall be eligible for routing, everything of interest can
be expressed on edge level using flow conservation constraints. A representation
as an action distribution can be reconstructed from this, if desired. It is unclear
how to do something similar for general NCRCGs, however.
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A. The Affine Mapping T
The mapping T is defined as follows. Empty entries in the matrix are zero.



















−1 −1 . . . −1︸ ︷︷ ︸
nN−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:MT∈Rn×(n−N)
v +

0
0
...
0
d1
0
0
...
0
d2
...
...
0
0
...
0
dN

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